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The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty
and Galileo’s Use of Experiments
Maarten Van Dyck†‡
Starting with a discussion of what I call ‘Koyre´’s paradox of conceptual novelty’, I
introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in
Galileo’s work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo’s con-
ceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the
experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these ex-
periments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s
pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually
occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential
part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.
1. Introduction. The emergence and establishment of classical mechanics
has always served as a prime example for debates on the nature of science
and its conceptual development. Accordingly, its study has often been a
place for a fruitful interaction between history and philosophy of science.
Galileo has since long been an emblem for modern experimental science
(for a recent example see Boumans 2003). At the same time, Galileo’s
own use of experiments has been a hotly debated topic during the past
century. This paper is intended to shed some light on the role that one
set of experiments played within Galileo’s science. Although of historical
interest, it must primarily be seen as contributing to the discussions on
the nature and function of different types of scientific experiments, dis-
cussions of which have been gaining momentum in the philosophy of
science over the past two decades.
In Section 3, I will discuss Galileo’s use of the experiments with a
pendulum that he describes in the first day of his Dialogues Concerning
Two New Sciences (Galileo [1638] 1954). I ascribe to these experiments a
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much more central role in Galileo’s science than is usually admitted. In
Section 4, I will analyze the light this sheds on the paradox of conceptual
novelty, which will be introduced in Section 2.
2. The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty. Alexandre Koyre´ is famous (in
some quarters, infamous) for denying that experiments played any fun-
damental role in Galileo’s establishment of his science (see especially
Koyre´ [1939] 1966, 1968). He gives two arguments for this claim. They
are connected, but the falsity of the first doesn’t imply that we can neglect
the second (although there has been a tendency to do so). After extensively
quoting Galileo’s description of his inclined plane experiments in the Two
New Sciences, Koyre´, in a typical example showing the essentially rhe-
torical nature of the first argument, remarks: “It is obvious that the Gal-
ilean experiments are completely worthless: the very perfection of their
results is a rigorous proof of their incorrection” (Koyre´ 1968, 94). Of
course, Koyre´ is right in remarking that Galileo must have exaggerated
the results of his experiments, but this need not imply that Galileo did
not perform them. Indeed, extensive research on his manuscripts has
revealed that Galileo did perform experiments with inclined planes, and
moreover, that at least some of his results were in essential agreement
with his theory (for a recent assessment of these experiments, see Hahn
2002). What should be remembered, however, is that Koyre´ had a phil-
osophical motivation for making provocative claims like the one quoted.
This provides a second argument for denying experiments a fundamental
role. At several places Koyre´ admits that Galileo might well have had an
experimental program (although he didn’t execute it properly), but he
stresses that these experiments can only consist in the testing of well-
formulated theoretical claims (Koyre´ [1939] 1966, 143, 155). For an ex-
perimental mathematical science such as classical mechanics to be pos-
sible, a theoretical language must first be established. Experimental results
cannot be at the foundation of a new mathematical science; they can only
come at the end, in the form of nature’s answers to theory’s questions
(Koyre´ [1939] 1966, 13, 156; Koyre´ 1968, 75–76). Before experiments
establishing the law of fall were possible, the very idea of motion already
had to be re-conceptualized.
Koyre´ was not the first to make this philosophical point. A famous
forerunner was Pierre Duhem ([1906] 1914). Both Koyre´ and Duhem
oppose a naı¨ve “abstractive empiricism,” which would see the establish-
ment of mathematical science grounded in inductive generalizations from
empirically observed regularities. As Duhem incessantly stresses, this goes
counter to the symbolic character of any truly mathematical science. Be-
fore an experimental fact can become epistemologically relevant for a
mathematical physical theory, it must first be translated into a symbolic
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language. This implies that the conceptual structure of the theory must
already be established before an empirical fact can have any epistemic
bearing on this theory. Koyre´ shares this insight, but couples it to a view
which sees the historical development of physics as characterized by a
discontinuous break during the scientific revolution (a term which he
understandably championed). In Galileo’s work we see the replacement
of one conceptual whole for another one. (The link with Thomas Kuhn’s
ideas is obvious, and Kuhn stressed his indebtedness to Koyre´ (Kuhn
[1962] 1996, 3).)
We seem to be presented with a paradox: where do Galileo’s new con-
cepts come from, if they cannot be abstracted from experimentally es-
tablished regularities? Whence conceptual novelty? Koyre´ had an answer:
Galileo’s metaphysical inclinations, his “Archimedean Platonism,” guided
and structured his conceptual revolution—metaphysics is what makes
measurement possible. Undoubtedly, this solution sounds rather naive,
and Koyre´’s answer doesn’t stand close scrutiny, but the problem that he
raised is genuine.
In their brilliant study, Renn et al. (2000) tackle the problem of Galileo’s
conceptual novelty and propose an ingenious solution, based on a careful
study of all the relevant material. By focussing on Galileo’s proof tech-
niques, they show in compelling detail how he was struggling to derive
theorems which are valid in classical mechanics by means of a conceptual
apparatus which was still “preclassical.” Nevertheless, the generation of
scientists immediately following Galileo could take these theorems as their
starting point, and let them dictate the appropriate conceptual framework,
which then became “classical.”
Thus, while for the first discoverer, the law of free fall is achieved by
applying and modifying an independently grounded, pre-existing con-
ceptual system, for his disciples it is the law of fall that canonically
defines key concepts in a new conceptual system. The very same
reading of these theorems that establishes classical mechanics also
obliterates the traces of its real historical genesis because the original
problems and the concepts involved are now understood within a
very different theoretical and semantic framework. But since the suc-
cessors themselves derive the inherited theorems on the basis of the
new concepts, they impute these concepts to the discoverers. (Dam-
erow et al. 2004, 5)
To properly solve the riddle of Galileo’s conceptual novelty, it is necessary
to push back the borderline. Galileo’s science at the same time was con-
tinuous with a preclassical conceptual system, and did constitute a break
with it—for those who came after him. I believe that this will prove to
be a lasting insight. Nevertheless, I also believe that Damerow et al.
THE PARADOX OF CONCEPTUAL NOVELTY 867
overlook something that is crucial to fully characterize how this break
was made possible by Galileo’s work. But let me first expand a little bit
on the mechanism for conceptual transformation that they propose.
The results achieved by Galileo implicitly define a new conceptual struc-
ture. These results were reached by applying given conceptual means to
peculiar problems. The nature of these problems, although defined in
terms of the given conceptual apparatus, forced Galileo to stretch the
limits of application of these conceptual means, showing the need to
transcend this conceptual apparatus. Through his exploration of these
limits, Galileo’s work already implicitly started the necessary conceptual
restructuring. Thus, the nature and origin of these problems becomes an
important question.
Damerow et al. locate two possible sources that can force someone like
Galileo to explore the limits of his conceptual apparatus: the introduction
of new objects of investigation, and the combination of conceptual means
that stood unconnected before. It is on the first of these that I want to
focus. The most important new object with which Galileo was confronted
was naturally accelerated motion, and more specifically the knowledge
that the space traversed by such a motion was as the square of time spent
in this motion.1 His attempts at trying to incorporate this knowledge into
a theoretical framework forced him to stretch his conceptual apparatus,
which was not suited to handle accelerated motion in an unproblematic
way. Hence, at the basis of Galileo’s implicit conceptual restructuring
there lies empirically given information. As I will show in Section 4, by
conceiving of this information as “given,” an essential element of the
conceptual transformation brought about by Galileo remains hidden.2 But
first I will have to go back to the first day of Galileo’s Two New Sciences.
3. Galileo’s Use of Experiments. The task Galileo set himself in con-
structing a mathematical science of motion was to bring the diverse el-
ements involved in the phenomena of local motion into a well-determined
relation, capable of being manipulated with his geometry of proportional
magnitudes. If a stable model for the free fall of bodies could be con-
structed, a host of properties surrounding the motion of bodies could be
1. Renn et al. (2000) provide definitive proof that as early as 1592 Galileo knew that
projectile motion has an approximately parabolic shape, and that he thereafter could
have derived a quadratic dependency between space and time.
2. It is true that Renn et al. (2000)—Ju¨rgen Renn is also credited with writing the
chapter on Galileo in Damerow et al. (2004)—stress that such information in itself is
not just “given.” It must be perceived as relevant, and this involves important contextual
factors. This is indeed a very important qualification, but as will become clear, I want
to point at still another qualification of this “given” character.
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analysed and investigated, thanks to the powerful and secure ways of
mathematical reasoning. As is well known, Galileo succeeded—within the
limits set by his conceptual apparatus—by considering the fall of bodies
in a void, a limit situation in which all bodies undergo the same uniform
acceleration.
3.1. Extrapolating to the Vacuum. In the first day of his Two New Sci-
ences3 Galileo leads the reader through a series of experiences, thought-
experiments, and what we would recognize as genuine “experiments,” all
adducing crucial insights on the phenomenon of free fall. He starts by
demonstrating the physical falsity of the Aristotelian teaching on the
subject.
First, experience and a clever thought experiment show that the velocity
of falling bodies cannot be directly proportional with their weight. Fur-
thermore, the velocity of falling bodies cannot be inversely proportional
to the density of the medium through which the bodies fall. Such a relation
implies that negative speeds (or speeds equal to zero) cannot be obtained
in any medium, whereas experience clearly shows that some bodies that
fall through air, move upwards in water (or are in equilibrium).
Thus far, falsifying Aristotle’s statements, Galileo has considered two
kinds of situation: different bodies falling through the same medium, or
one body falling through different media. At this point he announces: “I
then began to combine these two facts and to consider what would happen
if bodies of different weight were placed in media of different resis-
tances. . .” and he immediately gives the result “. . .and I found that
the differences in speed were greater in those media which were more
resistant, that is, less yielding” (113). If two bodies that fall through air
at almost exactly the same speeds, are observed when falling through
water, much greater differences in speed can be remarked, an observation
from which quickly follows the extrapolation: “Having observed this I
came to the conclusion that in a medium totally devoid of resistance all
bodies would fall with the same speed” (116).
At this point Galileo has falsified not only Aristotle’s theory, but also
the one he had defended himself in his earlier De Motu (probably written
around 1590–92) (Galileo 1960). In that work, Galileo had modelled the
phenomenon of free fall on hydrostatic phenomena, claiming that the
speed of a falling body is proportional to the difference between its specific
gravity and the medium’s specific gravity (anachronistically, we can say
that he replaced the “Aristotelian” ‘ ’ with something of the formv ∼ W/R
3. I will quote from the translation by Crew and de Salvio (Dover, 1954), and par-
enthetically give page references to the (standard) National Edition (ed. Favaro), as
also indicated in the Dover edition.
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‘ ’). (It was a well-known fact from the science of hydrostaticsv ∼ w r
that the effect of a medium is to make a body weigh less.) This model
would imply that in a void, the speeds of different bodies would stand in
the same ratio as their specific gravities, and that the differences in speed
should become less perceptible in more resisting media. Nevertheless, as
was already pointed out by Dijksterhuis (1924), in essential agreement
with the central thesis of Damerow et al., Galileo still seems to be working
with the same set of concepts in his later theory. The major difference is
that his theorizing is now more constrained by empirical information.
This comes out most clearly when we consider how Galileo treats the fact
that in resisting media different bodies do have different speeds.
3.2. Calculating the Differences. Galileo doesn’t stop with the claim
that in vacuum all bodies would fall with the same speed. Still taking into
account the hydrostatic model, but this time constrained by his empirical
findings, he now argues that what is really relevant to understand this is
the disproportionate way in which bodies of different specific gravity are
alleviated in different media. It is true, he remarks, that in a medium
there is always a resistance to be overcome for a body moving in free
fall, and we know that “the weight of the medium detracts from the weight
of the moving body, which weight is the means employed by the falling
body to open a path for itself and to push aside the parts of the me-
dium. . .” (119).
Galileo makes this clear by a number of examples. Suppose that lead
is 10,000 times as heavy as air while ebony is only 1000 times as heavy,
and let water be 800 times as heavy as air. The effect on the alleviation
of lead, in going to a denser medium such as water, will be negligible
compared with the effect of the denser medium on the specific gravity of
ebony. Although they have the same “unhindered speed” (121), the speeds
of ebony and lead in dense media will differ considerably, due to the
greater difficulty suffered by ebony in overcoming the obstacle posed by
the medium. This “buoyancy effect” of the medium would be calculable
in principle, provided all the absolute specific gravities were known, i.e.
the specific gravity measured with respect to vacuum, and not with respect
to air. The formula that would translate Galileo’s explanation in an al-
gebraic form would be: (with ‘w()’vp v [w(body) w(medium)]/w(body)0
the specific gravities, ‘v0’ the unhindered speed, and ‘v’ the speed in a
medium) (Dijksterhuis 1924, 229; Clavelin 1968, 340, n. 31).
3.3. Experimentally Isolating the Differences. This is not all. A medium
not only alleviates, it also has a frictional effect, which is dependent on
the speed of the falling body. “There is . . . an increase in the resistance
of the medium, not on account of any change in its essential properties,
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but on account of the change in rapidity with which it must yield and
give way laterally to the passage of the falling body which is constantly
accelerated” (119). At this stage, Galileo no longer has a theoretical model
which would allow him to calculate the difference a medium makes on
the fall of different kinds of bodies. However, he will show how to isolate
experimentally what differentiates the behavior of these bodies.
Galileo is in particular interested in the differences that might arise
between dense and light bodies when they fall over long distances, as he
suggested himself that this might pose a problem for his hypothesis of
equal unhindered speeds: in these circumstances, and even in a rare me-
dium such as air, dense bodies will outstrip the light ones with considerable
distances. Since such an observation poses practical problems, Galileo
suggests an ingenious experimental setup, mimicking this situation. “It
occurred to me therefore to repeat many times the fall through a small
height in such a way that I might accumulate all those small intervals of
time that elapse between the arrival of the heavy and light bodies re-
spectively at their common terminus, so that this sum makes an interval
of time which is not only observable, but easily observable” (128). The
experimental device standing in for fall over great distances is a pendulum,
and the assumed isochronity of the pendulum swings will be the clue to
Galileo’s analysis.
When two balls, one of lead and one of cork, are made to swing on
identical pendulums, two facts may be observed, Galileo claims. The
swings of the different balls remain isochronous with each other, while
the amplitude of the cork ball will diminish much more swiftly. That the
swings remain isochronous implies that when the two balls traverse equal
arcs, they do so in equal times: the greater retardation of the lighter body
cannot be due to an inferior natural speed. Hence, there can be no direct
correlation between the different specific gravities of the bodies and the
different speeds if they fall over long distances. All differences that do
arise must be due to the effect of the medium on the bodies, and this
effect can thus be shown present in the (differing rate of) diminution of
the amplitudes. Since the buoyancy effect is only dependent on the ratio
between the specific gravities of the falling body and the medium, which
is constant and hence cannot be responsible for a diminution of speed
(as witnessed by the shrinking amplitudes), the friction effect must be the
cause of the change in speeds. As a final conclusion we can infer that the
friction effect will be greater for bodies with a smaller specific gravity,
hence explaining why dense bodies outstrip light ones.
3.4. Function of the Pendulum Experiments: Securing Reference. Let us
take stock of what Galileo has achieved with these discussions presented
in the first day. He has shown that a stable model for free fall can be
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constructed by considering the situation of fall in a vacuum—since in this
case all bodies will exhibit the same behavior, independent of their specific
weight. Remark that he has not yet established the exact relations con-
stituting such a model: this will only be done in the third day where the
quadratic dependency will finally find its place. That the model thus con-
structed will still be relevant for actually occurring instances of free fall, is
secured by his particular experimental procedure, guaranteeing that the case
of fall in a void is not merely the simplest case, but the most general. By
isolating all that actually differentiates different kinds of bodies with re-
spect to the phenomenon of free fall, it becomes possible for Galileo to
attribute the presence of the “pure phenomenon” to actually occurring
instances of free fall, even if these might show considerable deviations
from the theoretical models. To put it in a language familiar from con-
temporary philosophy of science (cf., e.g., Pickering 1981 and Galison
1987), Galileo has established what a closed system with respect to the
phenomenon of free fall consists in. He has shown how to separate the
pure phenomenon from possible disturbances, how to retract a meaningful
signal from the noisy actual behavior. To put it in a language relevant
for the discussions on conceptual novelty: Galileo has experimentally se-
cured the reference of his theoretical models.
Naylor (1989) stresses that there is an important shift within Galileo’s
work from what he calls a pre-empirical episteme towards a much more
modern attitude in his later work such as the Two New Sciences. None-
theless, he doesn’t ascribe any central role to the pendulum experiments
in this respect. This is also testified by an earlier article where he claims
that these experiments merely served a didactic purpose (Naylor 1976).
Compare also Hill (1988), who sees these experiments as “a means of
shoring up soft spots in his geometrical exposition” (Hill 1988, 666). It
is clear that, contrary to these authors, I perceive an epistemologically
deep role for these experiments. They assure Galileo that in principle, he
can transpose to other cases results that are strictly valid only for a vacuum
(although he is not able to calculate all the effects of the medium in
advance, in the fourth day he does describe experimental means to esti-
mate the effects). This is what is meant by saying that these experiments
show that fall in a vacuum is not merely the simplest case, but the most
general.
Admittedly, we can no longer accept Galileo’s description of the dis-
turbances: His understanding of the effect of a medium is conceptually
confused (cf. Westfall 1971, 30–36), and the frictional effect is not linear
with speed (cf., e.g., Naylor 1976). But this doesn’t impinge upon the
function that his experiments with the pendulum have within Galileo’s
science.
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4. Galileo’s Experiments and Conceptual Novelty. The main flaw of
Koyre´’s treatment of the problem of conceptual novelty is that he isn’t
sufficiently aware of the way new concepts can be implicitly constructed
by putting older concepts to new uses. This neglect is what makes con-
ceptual novelty appear paradoxical. However, as shown by Damerow et
al., this construction is far from straightforward. I will now argue that
they also overlook an essential element entering into this construction.
As was explained in Section 2, central to the argument of Damerow et
al. is the idea that Galileo’s exploration of the limits of preclassical me-
chanics implicitly defined the concepts of classical mechanics. This ex-
ploration was triggered and constrained by the attempt to apply the pre-
classical concepts to the problem of accelerated motion. True, but I want
to stress that Galileo’s conceptual restructuring was not only constrained
but also positively controlled by experimental means. He was not only
trying to incorporate empirical information into his conceptual frame-
work, but also experimentally reworking the problem situation. Galileo
was not only stretching the limits of application of his preclassical con-
cepts, but also experimentally investigating the proper domain of appli-
cation for a true science of falling bodies. The stabilization of concepts
is not independent of the stabilization of the empirical situation. The
implicit definition of the classical concepts is co-constituted by the ap-
plication of the preclassical concepts to carefully selected, and not as such
given, situations. By establishing that the case of fall in a void was the
most general, and hence could be called the natural behavior of bodies,
Galileo did pave the way for what would become the central domain of
application of classical mechanics. The transition from an Aristotelian
dynamical framework to the Newtonian is unthinkable without this
intervention.
Rose-Mary Sargent has aptly remarked that experiment constitutes a
third methodological category that mixes elements from classical empir-
icism and rationalism (Sargent 1995, 231, n. 50). This also holds true with
respect to the problem of conceptual meaning. The meaning of modern
scientific concepts is fully determined neither by the conceptual structure
of which they are a part, nor by the empirical objects, or properties, or
whatever, to which they are supposed to refer. It is only the way that these
aspects are put together by experimental means that gives these concepts
their full meaning. At the same time, the character of the situations thus
described takes on a new dimension.
As a result of Galileo’s experimental analysis, it becomes possible for
him to attribute the presence of the pure phenomenon to actually occur-
ring instances of free fall, transforming the character of the latter through
this attribution. From now on, it will become possible to speak mean-
ingfully about the velocity and the acceleration of the falling objects, and
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especially about the (mathematical) relations obtaining between them, as
defined and analyzed at the theoretical level of the new science. At the
same time, the meaning of the abstract concepts of velocity and accel-
eration will be co-constituted through this attribution. The experiments
with the pendulum are essential to all this, because they secure the ref-
erence of the pure phenomenon in non-pure situations. In contradistinc-
tion to Koyre´’s view, the abstractly floating concepts are tied to empirical
reality from the beginning.
What I called the paradox of conceptual novelty is related to the well
known riddle of the applicability of mathematics to nature. That new
concepts cannot be abstracted from empirical knowledge—this would not
be paradoxical if these concepts were not supposed to constitute a physical
science, i.e., be applicable to nature. Galileo famously claimed that the
book of nature is written in a mathematical language, but the preceding
discussion reveals how the reading of that book can only take place via
the mediation of experimentally constructed situations. Experimental ac-
tivity is what makes possible a mathematical science of nature, by securing
the reference of theoretically defined concepts.
5. Concluding Remarks. It is clear that the perspective I have taken here
is informed by the so-called “new experimentalism” that found a very
influential and early expression in Ian Hacking’s Representing and Inter-
vening (Hacking 1983). Hacking was very effective in drawing attention
to the multiple functions that experiments can have, other than confirming
or falsifying theoretical claims. Experiments not only “give” empirical
content to theories, but also have a structure that shapes this content.
My critique of Damerow et al. has exactly been that they focus too ex-
clusively on the way Galileo represented problems. By intervening ex-
perimentally he also reconstituted these problems, transforming their na-
ture in a way that was essential for the establishment of the new conceptual
structure of classical mechanics.
Both Galileo’s experiments leading up to the extrapolation to the sit-
uation of fall in a void (Section 3.1), and his experiments with the pen-
dulum to exhibit the presence of the pure case of free fall in actually
occurring instances (Section 3.3), show many of the characteristics of what
Friedrich Steinle has called “exploratory experiments”: “Exploratory ex-
perimentation . . . is driven by the elementary desire to obtain empirical
regularities and to find out proper concepts and classifications by means
of which those regularities can be formulated” (Steinle 1997, S70). He
also stresses that, in this respect, “of particular importance is the idea of
elaborating ‘pure’ or ‘simple’ cases” (S73). I am in complete agreement
with Steinle’s insistence on the fact that these kinds of experiments can
be epistemologically very relevant and should not be relegated to some
874 MAARTEN VAN DYCK
kind of mystical “context of discovery.” One important difference between
the cases he discusses, and the case of Galileo discussed here, is that
Galileo was not merely exploring experimentally, but exploring the limits
of his conceptual apparatus at the same time (as described by Damerow
et al.). A truly satisfactory picture can be gained only by focussing both
on how he was representing and on how he was intervening.
Let me fittingly end by linking Galileo’s work with his pendulum, trying
to retract a meaningful signal from the noisy actual behavior of falling
bodies, to the work of that other Florentine giant.
Michelangelo was once asked how he had carved his marble mas-
terpiece. The sculptor apocryphally responded that nothing could be
simpler; all one needed was to remove everything that was not David.
In this respect the laboratory is not so different from the studio. As
the artistic tale suggests, the task of removing the background is not
ancillary to identifying the foreground—the two tasks are one and the
same. (Galison 1987, 256)
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